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kantliebe
15 December 2009 @ 10:20 pm
"As soon as man starts to think, the firm ground slips from under his feet, forcing him somehow to build his castles in the air." Mattijs van Boxsel

The real problem is to avoid the fate of Buridan's ass which starved to death because it could not chose between two identical haystacks. But our problem is worse than that because the ass at least had hunger as a clear motivation. Without the benefit of an unjustified and unjustifiable urge to action or survival, there is not even a possibility of us deciding to try to chose or to do anything.

If this passes without objection, maybe this site can again be used for its originally intended benign and stupid purpose.
 
 
kantliebe
20 January 2008 @ 06:45 pm
It is clear that deciding what to do is the primary task. Failure to decide what to do itself results in a decision not to act or to act without deciding. So, ethics, broadly defined, is the primary task of philosophy.

A child once thought that a sound ethics would have to be based on a sound understanding of metaphysics, which in turn required a sound epistemology. Unfortunately, it is not possible to find or create a sound metaphysics or epistemology in time to direct life. Once must just build in the air if one is going to make decisions.

Unfortunately, indecision still may control if one is unable to execute. But that is a separate problem.
 
 
kantliebe
16 January 2008 @ 06:00 pm
A famous peculiarity of Kant's system is that he values acting out of duty over acting out of feeling. One who helps someone out of compassion is being swept by emotion while someone who has no compassion but forces himself to help because he feels it is his duty is acting ethically.

Of course, some of us do not help at all and the question never arises.

Hopefully, work can be done on the program set forth in the outline at some point soon.
 
 
kantliebe
15 December 2007 @ 11:04 am
The basic question is "what should we do?"

I. Why be ethical ?

This is fundamental to any application of ethics to the question of what we should do but it cannot be approached until a lot of other things are slogged through. It may be that a proper explanation of the corrects ethics will answer the question.

II. What is an Ethical Act ?

Clearly one cannot focus on the result of the act. An ethical act is one done with a good intent. (Kant)

It is true that the "road to hell is paved with good intentions" but the right-of-way was cleared with bad intentions. Laziness about determining the likely results of ones actions is one form of "bad intention" and so "it was well-intentioned" is frequently untrue.

In any event, since we do not know with certainty the results of our actions when we act, defining the ethical act as one with the most favorable result does not help us decide what to do.

III Rival Criteria for proper ethical actions

A. What a god or gods want us to do as revealed in some scripture as interpreted by someone or other.
This view will be discussed and trashed.

B. Egoism (De Sade) - Most would not call this ethical but it can be described as the belief that one SHOULD do what one wants to do.

As explained earlier, in practice this view may be harder to distinguish from other views than is commonly thought. The problem may be that De Sade had a poor upbringing and lousy tastes that led to poor results. The sensitive egoist might in practice (and even principle) be hard to distinguish from the saint.

The egoist must decide what he wants.

C. Utilitarianism (Mills et al) -

Rule v. strict utilitarianism

Again, a problem centers on value. What should be maximized? The answer is only obviously "happiness" if one defines "happiness" so that is by definition what people should maximize. It is happy to say that the Viet Cong who blows himself up for Communism without believing that he will receive any heavenly reward acted to advance his "happiness" but some naive ideas of happiness would suggest he did.

D. Kant's theory - Act according to a maxim that one can accept as universal.

This is a fine definition for what is "ethical" but will be shown to be under-defined and impracticable for telling us what to do. Also, the problem of value is critical. Persons will vary as to what they could will to be universal based on their view of what there should be.

After looking at 4 sets of criteria, it will be seen that we have no idea what to do without a theory of value (i.e. what is good in itself)

IV The Theory of Value

Rival theories

A. Whatever god or gods want

Another theory to trash quickly

B. Whatever I want

Back to Sade but need not have as bad taste.

C. What humans or Sentient Beings want

This avoids the problem of the Viet Cong but raises new problems.

C. Happiness (Aristotle)

But what is happiness? It would appear to be an emergent property from the evolution of the universe like consciousness? It is something that developed to promote the survival of species. Is it so obvious such a Darwinian accident should be crowned as the source of value. But if not, what other source of value could there be?

The problem then becomes weighing happiness. Further, some sorts of happiness seem unworthy of recognition, but to admit that defeats the theory that the thing that is of value in itself is happiness.
 
 
kantliebe
15 December 2007 @ 10:50 am
10/17/07 10:03 pm

Three apparently contradictory versions of ethics:

1. Egotism
2. Neutral Utilitarianism
3. Kantian Categorical Imperative.

They may have little to separate them in practice.

Even moderately enlightened egoism must take into account the interest of others insofar as others may affect the decider through their actions or through sympathy. It might in practice be impossible to differentiate egoism from a utilitarianism that attempts to take everyone’s interests into account impartially because the “sensitive egoist” will not want to hurt others who may hurt him or whose suffering will cause him sympathetic pain.

Is it even possible to distinguish someone who decides on his actions based on maximizing his happiness, taking into account that he or she may be more or less happy based on the feeling of others, from someone who attempts to maximize the happiness of the relevant group. A person who was sympathetic enough to the rest of humanity that he could not be happy to the extent that happiness was not maximized, would not in principle perform different actions from one who attempted to maximize the happiness of all humanity. Would the sympathetic egoist, even in principle, be less praiseworthy than the person who sought to maximize the happiness of all of humanity even if it did not maximize his or her happiness?

Well, maybe. How one’s motivations control one’s actions may be decisive.



10/27/07

The following text from the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals by Kant is here for future reference.

I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim
should become a universal law. Here, now, it is the simple
conformity to law in general, without assuming any particular law
applicable to certain actions, that serves the will as its principle
and must so serve it, if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a
chimerical notion. The common reason of men in its practical
judgements perfectly coincides with this and always has in view the
principle here suggested. Let the question be, for example: May I when
in distress make a promise with the intention not to keep it? I
readily distinguish here between the two significations which the
question may have: Whether it is prudent, or whether it is right, to
make a false promise? The former may undoubtedly of be the case. I see
clearly indeed that it is not enough to extricate myself from a
present difficulty by means of this subterfuge, but it must be well
considered whether there may not hereafter spring from this lie much
greater inconvenience than that from which I now free myself, and
as, with all my supposed cunning, the consequences cannot be so easily
foreseen but that credit once lost may be much more injurious to me
than any mischief which I seek to avoid at present, it should be
considered whether it would not be more prudent to act herein
according to a universal maxim and to make it a habit to promise
nothing except with the intention of keeping it. But it is soon
clear to me that such a maxim will still only be based on the fear
of consequences. Now it is a wholly different thing to be truthful
from duty and to be so from apprehension of injurious consequences. In
the first case, the very notion of the action already implies a law
for me; in the second case, I must first look about elsewhere to see
what results may be combined with it which would affect myself. For to
deviate from the principle of duty is beyond all doubt wicked; but
to be unfaithful to my maxim of prudence may often be very
advantageous to me, although to abide by it is certainly safer. The
shortest way, however, and an unerring one, to discover the answer
to this question whether a lying promise is consistent with duty, is
to ask myself, "Should I be content that my maxim (to extricate myself
from difficulty by a false promise) should hold good as a universal
law, for myself as well as for others?" and should I be able to say
to myself, "Every one may make a deceitful promise when he finds
himself in a difficulty from which he cannot otherwise extricate
himself?" Then I presently become aware that while I can will the lie,
I can by no means will that lying should be a universal law. For
with such a law there would be no promises at all, since it would be
in vain to allege my intention in regard to my future actions to those
who would not believe this allegation, or if they over hastily did
so would pay me back in my own coin. Hence my maxim, as soon as it
should be made a universal law, would necessarily destroy itself.

We can see immediately that Old Kant himself saw that the end result in terms of action may be equivalent of differing ways of reasoning. The egoist and the Kantian might both decide not to lie. But it is unclear even if the motivations can be divided in principle.

Our sympathetic egoist might act like a utilitarian who would maximize happiness for everyone as a whole. It is unclear that his thought process could be differentiated from the utilitarian’s thought process even in principle.

What if someone adopted the maxim that he should always do the act that maximizes happiness for all sentient beings. Can a Kantian who adopts this “universal law” to be differentiated from a utilitarian? Might the utilitarian just be called a Kantian who has adopted one particular universal maxim?

November 17, 2007

Can happiness be a proper value to stand at the center of ethics. Plainly it grew out of a Darwinian feedback mechanism.

Three things obscure this:
1. Actions that make one happy but do not lead to reproductive success of the one made happy may help cousins or even species.
2. Some people are wired incorrectly
3. Some conduct that makes one happy may have been isolated or displaced from reproductive success. (e.g. desire for sexual relations may be isolated from reproduction)
 
 
kantliebe
07 October 2007 @ 01:27 pm
November 27, 2006

Professor Lee Smolin
31 Caroline St.
Waterloo, Ontario
Canada, N2L 2Y5
LSmolin@perimeterinstitute.ca

Dear Professor Smolin:

The purpose of this letter is principally to enable its author to sort out his ideas about The Life of the Cosmos (“TLOC”) . I found TLOC to be one of the best and most thought-provoking books I have read. Particularly good was your discussion of the philosophical underpinnings of modern cosmology and physics, a problem generally glossed over by popular physics books many of which seem more calculated to stimulate an “oh wow” reaction than further thought.

I am, however, sending this letter to you for two reasons. First, I would naturally love to receive some response to my thoughts presented below. Perhaps your publisher is paying some starving graduate student to respond to letters written to you by adoring dilettanti. Second and more realistically, I hope to inspire you to address some of the matters I discuss here in a future book or in a new edition of TLOC.

I proceed with assurance that you are still interested in explicating views contained in TLOC. Although TLOC was written over a decade ago, my reading of your more recent papers on the Internet indicates that you have not abandoned the issues you discussed in TLOC. Your recent debates with the proponents of the Anthropic Principle (“AP”) and the more doctrinaire advocates of String Theory (“ST”) seem to flow directly from principles presented in TLOC. I am not, however, primarily interested in those debates although they probably are playing a large role in your life now.

While certainly not in a position to advise you on anything to do with physics or the philosophical issues relating to it, I am in an excellent position to present you with raw data on ignorance and errors typical of the prime audience for popular physics books. I have been reading popular physics books, which I refer to as “physics for phools” books, for over 40 years since I tried to understand relativity from George Gamov. I continue to read about two such books a year. While I am probably better read in philosophy than most readers of phools books, I am innocent of any real knowledge of math beyond the sixth grade level and professionally work as a lawyer representing environmental organizations in matters relating to water pollution.

Given this introduction, I trust you will not read any suggestion, question or argument presented below as an attempt to cast doubt on anything you have written or to challenge any of your conclusions. Rather these thoughts, even when presented as arguments, are all to be taken as indications of places where the ignorant may need further assistance.

This letter is divided into four sections. After raising a number of matters that I believe might be handled in a future work, I present thoughts (and misconceptions) on philosophical issues raised in TLOC.

I. Problems for Better Explication

There are a few things that I think need to done to help readers better understand the topics addressed in TLOC.

A. Terminology for Discussing Everything

Authors of popular physics books should adopt a convention as to how to refer to everything that there is. As Leonard Susskind mentions in his 2004 debate with you on the Anthropic Principle, the word for everything there is used to be “universe.” Now that we are talking about multiple universes, a new term needs to be invented for everything. Maybe that is what you meant by “cosmos,” but that’s not clear and there are presentations in TLOC that are less clear for this reason.

In the balance of this letter, I will adopt the convention that the word for everything (including all universes and anything that could be outside any universe) is “cosmos.” Accordingly, I may ask how many universes there are in the cosmos but will not ask what lies outside the cosmos.

B. Where does all the stuff come from?

Somewhere there should be some answer to the prejudice of the ignorant that something does not come from nothing. I gather that black holes have only a finite amount of mass and that it is the amount of this mass that determines some of the properties of black holes. How then is it possible that a black hole can give birth to another universe that has multiple black holes each of which in turn can give birth to another universe that will contain multiple black holes? Where does the stuff come from for all this new creation?

I have heard of the concept of vacuum energy and false vacuums but I do not see how this is the supply of stuff for an infinite number of universes emerging from black holes. Probably I am missing something simple here, but one assumes certain duties when one writes books for the simple minded.

C. Time in the cosmos or just in the universe (or universes)?

Time and causation in TLOC need further explication. Your Cosmological Natural Selection (“CNS”) theory relies on causation between universes at least to the extent that changes between universes must be “small.” (TLOC p. 117) Further, it is stated that “[t]ime does not end in the centers of black holes” (TLOC p. 116) However, “there is no meaning to time beyond change.” (TLOC p. 355) and it has commonly been thought that causation and time only make sense as applied within the universe. Indeed, if space and time all have to do with the contours of a particular universe and relations within a particular universe, it is unclear what meaning time or causation could have as applied to the cosmos or outside of any particular universe.

Somewhere it must be explained how time is to be handled in relation to the cosmos as a whole. It appears from your treatment of “time” as relational that the concept of time simply has no bearing as to the cosmos but it would appear that some concept of cosmic time emerges from your theory that black holes give rise to new universes that resemble the universe of the parent black hole.

D. The Relational Theory of Space and Time

TLOC handles the debate between Newton and Leibniz and the difference between special and general relativity particularly well. Although I have read about a dozen presentations of this material, I think it finally sort of clicked.

I have one quibbling issue, though. I suspect that the dizziness one feels from spinning and the sensations one gets from accelerating have more to do with human physiological processes than with the properties of general relativity. At least I believe that the Darwinian reasons for us perceiving acceleration and rotation differently from inertial movement have more to do with the needs of dealing with matters on earth than with orienting ourselves relative to the universe as a whole.

We are not typically in ship cabins without windows and do have ways of identifying our movements relative to the surface of the earth. That such relative movement is normally perceived with our eyes while there are additional senses that perceive acceleration and rotation would seem to be a matter of biology.

II. Principles of Scientific Explanation

The nature of science and what counts as a scientific explanation really seems to be the big fish to fry here. It is at the center of the Anthropic Principle debate and, from what I see from Science News and your article for the New York Academy of Science, your recent disagreements with some practitioners of string theory.

It is a notorious fact of philosophy that whenever one starts trying to set forth the principles for ethics, knowledge or anything else some joker asks what the basis is for those principles. The effort to supply that basis leads to setting forth a set of meta-principles for which justification can also be demanded. It was realized, at least as early as the time of Aristotle, that at some point one has to tell the joker to accept the principle as obviously true or, at least, shut up. The principle of sufficient reason cannot require that everything be justified.

In TLOC, you discuss or allude to a number of criteria that should be used in determining whether a theory is potentially true or scientific. Behind some of these criteria there are further arguments stated either in TLOC or in more recent articles. These criteria are that scientific theories:

1. Agree with observations

Everyone agrees with this criterion in principle although there are often none so blind as those that will not see. Also, what we are looking for may affect what we observe both as a matter of psychology and quantum physics.

2. Rest on few unexplained facts and principles

It is generally assumed that a theory with fewer laws, ultimate entities and forces is better than one with more. Everyone seems to assume this is true and probably this is a suitable place to just tell the joker to accept the criterion and shut up. The holy grail for this principle would be to prove, as Descartes attempted, that all the observable facts can be explained as a matter of logic from the mere fact of existence. ST is a bit less ambitious and hopes to explain everything using a theory that everything consists of one type of string that is vibrated in various ways in various dimensions to make up the cosmos. The inability of ST to reach a unique set of basic parameters is seen by some as further support for the AP

In any event, the criterion that a theory should use few laws and entities is taken in this letter as self-justifying.

3. Are self- evident or, at least, not ad hoc

In addition to having few entities, laws and initial conditions, we want the given to be self-evident and not to appear ad hoc. Just saying it all depends on a god is simple enough but does not explain anything. We must start somewhere, but we do not want to start somewhere that ends the game before it begins.

This principle of science is harder for much of the world to accept than the first two stated. The religious person might ask what is wrong with accepting a dues ex machina explanation if it leads to a happy ending to the play. Science, however, is right in rejecting this argument as being inconsistent with the game it wants to play.

But the joker still has questions to pose here that the scientist cannot simply reject as out of bounds. When is something self-evident or acceptable as an initial condition? The idea that universes can spring out of nothing, even if there is a lot of energy contained in the modern concept of “nothing”, strikes a lot of people as far from self-evident. At some point do we just accept things as true because we observe them, even if we have no basis for explaining them, because “that is the way things are?”

If the string theorists could do away with the landscape, get the number of entities and laws down to only a half dozen, fix on a particular number of dimensions and (using some means of observation yet unknown) observe the ultimate entities and dimensions, one could still ask why they stopped there. What is the reason there are these entities, dimensions and laws? Indeed, this question might be asked of anything short of Descartes’ proposal that everything be shown to be necessary from the bear fact that there is some form of existence.

4. Verifiable

This is the main weapon you launch against AP and ST. In a recent article, you state that, “[o]ne of the most fundamental principles of science has been that we only consider as possibly true those theories that are vulnerable to being shown false by doable experiments.” But it does not seem that everyone accepts this “fundamental principle.” There is a very active debate as to the extent in which the principle that a theory should be able to be falsified is a requirement of science.

In TLOC and other of your writings this principle is not really taken as given. It is argued for using appeals to other practical and philosophical principles including the suggestion that, due to failure to adhere to this principle sufficiently, many people pursuing ST have wasted a lot of time and research money.

Still, to some degree, this seems to be a matter of trying to agree on what game to play. One could play a game like soccer that allowed players to carry the ball in their hands and the game might be fun, but it would not be soccer. Although Susskind and other ST defenders say that they think that their theories will eventually be able to be tested, they are less concerned about verifiability than you are. Whether this is “unscientific” is not clear because the boundaries of science are not set forth as clearly as the rules of soccer.

Let’s assume that someday the ST people work out their math and physics to the point that they can offer an interpretation of the universe that uses just a few rules, entities and dimensions that involve only aesthetically pleasing numbers, but that these entities, dimensions and laws could not be tested in any way given the equipment we are likely to have in any of our lifetimes. I gather Smolin would say that the ultimate theory has not been achieved but the proponents of ST would say that it had. You might argue that accepting an unfalsifiable theory is just not science and that if mankind were willing to accept aesthetically pleasing theories that could not be tested, it would have stopped doing science after being presented with any one of the “beautiful” religious or philosophical systems of the ancient world. The hypothetical string theorists could answer that their theory is not arbitrary, it is aesthetically pleasing and mankind should just accept it and work on curing the common cold. I do not see a way to resolve the debate at that point except by letting you keep working on a verifiable theory and them retire.

To put the matter another way, is insisting that science must be verifiable to insist that the ultimate reason for a phenomena accepted by science must be an observation? Must one keep asking for a sufficient reason until one can just point to what one sees and say “see, it’s there.” What I will call the aesthetic theory of science is willing to stop with principles that are aesthetically pleasing, simple and consistent with observations.

Finally, the requirements for when something is verified are not clear as to cosmological issues. We will never be able to receive any sort of direct evidence of another universe. The most that will happen is that positing that there is a universe creating mechanism that creates many universes is the most elegant way to explain facts about our universe that would otherwise have to be attributed to chance. This is unlikely to be considered verification by people who generally verify things by seeing or touching them.

5. Gratifying to the human spirit

Everyone, whether they admit it or not, also seems to want a theory of the cosmos that allows progress, avoids “heat death” and otherwise gives some sort of meaning to human life. Probably no one thinks that this is a scientific principle but direct and indirect appeals are made based on this principle all the time. (See e.g. TLOC pp. 179, 218, 373)

This does not look so bad. Why do we do science anyway? Assuming it is not contrary to observable facts, why should we not prefer a theory that makes us happy over one that makes us miserable?

Indeed, I have toyed in the past with developing an “anti-scientific” theory that is based entirely on what would be true of the cosmos if things were as we would find them most satisfying. Most of our current religions would fail badly on this point because, having been designed when life was short and brutish, they make human life on earth a far too trivial affair to satisfy people committed to being here long. Given the expectation of a fairly long life, but the knowledge of eventual death of ourselves as individuals and of all things in time, one is looking for a cosmos that allows lives something like an organized sport in which it is important to play each game to win but there is another game tomorrow and a new season after this season’s winner has had a period to celebrate. We would like an eternal return with infinite variety, memory of past episodes and the possibility of continued growth.

It will be seen below that measured using the “gratification” criterion, the CNS theory does not really seem to do much better than the weak AP.


III. Theories for Explanation of the Remarkably Felicitous Shape of the Universe

A particularly strong element of TLOC is the way the governing parameters for the universe are set forth and the presentation of the menu of possible theories for addressing the reason for this felicitous and unlikely collection of governing parameters. The menu consists of:

- Strong AP (god)
- Weak AP (very large number of universes chosen at random)
- There is only a single unique mathematically consistent theory (the rationalist’s dream)
- Fundamental “parameters may actually change in time” (TLOC p. 55-56)

TLOC rejects Strong AP as unscientific and, although I think this would have pained your hero Leibniz, the Rationalist theory that everything is as it must be as an a priori matter, because it “strains credulity.”(TLOC 55-6) No argument here as to either of these points although it is possible that, without explaining everything, the need for logical and mathematical consistency might have considerably cut down the number of possible universes that have to be created for the AP to work.

After setting forth the menu, TLOC then goes on to explain the CNS theory.

IV. How does CNS fair against the principles of science and specter of the Eternal Return

It seems from the AP debate and other papers that you still fully support the CNS theory at least as to charges that it contradicts what is now known about black holes.

As I understand CNS theory, it holds:

1. At least one universe simply came into existence (proven by observation),
2. It is very unlikely that any universe that simply came into existence would have the parameters we observe in our universe (proven by observation of the parameters and the fact that they are so scattered and unrelated in scale),
3. The cosmos has at least two universe-creating mechanisms that work after the initial universe(s) come into being: bounce from the collapse of a universe and creation from black holes, (postulated),
4. The black hole mechanism is capable of creating many more universes than the other existing mechanism(s), (postulated),
5. Universes that create black holes have highly unlikely parameters (proven through physics I do not understand)
6. At least the mechanism that creates universes from black holes creates universes that have similar parameters as its parent universe, (postulated by Smolin, but claimed to be impossible by Susskind and others)
7. Because universes with parameters that favor creation of black holes create more progeny, such universes are favored by natural selection and are more common, (Darwinian logic)
8. We are probably on a ordinary universe (mediocrity principle) -
Therefore, the universe in which we find ourselves is one that favors creation of black holes.

Further, this theory is testable, unlike the AP, because we can observe whether the parameters in our universe are those that facilitate creation of black holes. Thus, it does better on criterion #4 above and, assuming you are right about black holes, does as well on #1 as AP and the theory that new universes are created only by eternal inflation.

Arguably, CNS has less simplicity (criterion #2) than eternal inflation because eternal inflation may only need one universe-creating mechanism while CNS needs two, but that is not clear. One should also score AP and CNS as a draw on #3 as neither theory seems ad hoc although unfortunately neither would probably have impressed Descartes as self-evident either.

You seem to think that CNS does better at gratifying our desire for evolution and progress and avoids the Eternal Return that Nietzsche and others found to be so dreary. (TLOC pp. 179, 371) It is not apparent why you would feel this way.

Under CNS, “[t]here must be enormous numbers of other universes” (TLOC p. 118). Why there would be any less under CNS than under the assumption that there must be a sufficient number of universes for observers to become probable under the AP? Indeed, there does not seem any reason why there is anything short of an infinite number of universes in the cosmos under either theory. Both theories postulate universe-making mechanisms that create huge number of universes without suggesting any limit to the operation of the mechanism(s). To argue that the processes run out of gas at some point seems completely arbitrary. The only difference between CNS and AP in generating an infinite number of universes is that, being less random, a higher proportion of the infinite number of universes contains black holes and, as a result, a higher proportion of the universes contains observers.

It is the infinite number of universes combined with the finite number of possible universes that generates the Eternal Return. CNS does not suggest a way around that.

Also, the dreariness is not lessened by any real evolutionary progress. The evolution of universes, if it exists, is quite limited. Once the parameters for peak production of black holes are found, the black hole universe-creating mechanism will hover around those parameters eternally. Further, I did not learn anything from the infinite number of other [Kantliebes] in other universes. Nothing I learn here will be of any benefit to any of them. The only progress is within a universe and each such universe may face a heat death or a big crunch. Disallowing the possibility of an observer outside of the universe(s) (TLOC p. 334) only makes things more dreary by eliminating any hope of a memory and of anyone getting any lasting benefit of the infinite number of dice games.

If the number of universes in the cosmos is infinite and the number of possible universes is finite, it really seems like we can almost go back to Plato and see the “form” as primary and the “matter” as secondary. Everything possible is realized an infinite number of times. Each new universe is just another boring affair and the point of science would be to determine all the possible universes. We might be back to Leibniz, as well as the other rationalist philosophers, more than you would like.

Thank you for your consideration.


Respectfully submitted,




original was signed

Doctor Smolin sent no response but then I did not really expect him too. It would be best if he dealth with some of these issues in his next book.
 
 
kantliebe
07 October 2007 @ 01:14 pm
The basic problem is that it would appear that everything is created an infinite number of times. There exists the best and the worse of all possible worlds in an infinite number of copies. In the past I have collected quotes on this as follows:

All and Why

A set of theories have emerged that go a fair distance to explain what there is and why it is here in some sense. However, the ultimate questions of central importance to humans - God, purpose, meaning, mortality or immortality - cannot be so answered.

We start with the question of whether we should expect answers and find ultimately that we must rely on faith.

“There is no logical reason why the Universe should not contain surd or arbitrary elements that do no relate to the rest.
...
“The modern search for a Theory of Everything is the ultimate expression of the belief that there is an abbreviated representation of the logic behind the Universe’s properties that can be written down in finite form by human beings.” John D. Barrow

Plainly, the whole endeavor to explain what there is an why depends on an assumption that there is an explanation although things need not be explicable, particularly need not be explicable to human beings. (12/17/00)


The Physical Explanation

We can conjecture a reasonable theory of how the physical universe looks as it does by positing a “pregnant nothing.” By creating something out of nothing, God throws dice, or rather dice are thrown. This theory is explained by Professors Kaku:

"A remarkable consensus has been developing recently around what is called "quantum cosmology," where scientists believe that a merger of the quantum theory and Einstein's relativity may resolve these sticky theological questions. Theoretical physicists are rushing in where the angels fear to tread!

In particular, an appealing but starting new picture is emerging in quantum cosmology which may be able to synthesize some of the great mythologies of creation.

There are two dominant religious mythologies. According to Judeo‑Christian belief, the universe had a definite beginning. This is the Genesis hypothesis, where the universe was hatched from a Cosmic Egg. However, according to the Hindu‑Buddhist belief in Nirvana, the universe is timeless; it never had a beginning, nor will it have an end.

Quantum cosmology proposes a beautiful synthesis of these seemingly hostile viewpoints. In the beginning was Nothing. No space, no matter or energy. But according to the quantum principle, even Nothing was unstable. Nothing began to decay; i.e. it began to "boil," with billions of tiny bubbles forming and expanding rapidly. Each bubble became an expanding universe.

If this is true, then our universe is actually part of a much larger "multiverse" of parallel universes, which is truly timeless, like Nirvana.

As Nobel laureate Steve Weinberg has said, "An important implication is that there wasn't a beginning; that there were increasingly large Big Bangs, so that the [multiverse] goes on forever ‑ one doesn't have to grapple with the question of it before the Bang. The [multiverse] has justbeen here all along. I find that a very satisfying picture."

Universes can literally spring into existence as a quantum fluctuation of Nothing. (This is because the positive energy found in matter is balanced against the negative energy of gravity, so the total energy of a bubble is zero. Thus, it takes no net energy to create a new universe.)

As Alan Guth, originator of the inflationary theory, once said, "It's often said there is no such thing as a free lunch. But the universe itself may be a free lunch."

Andre Linde of Stanford has said, "If my colleagues and I are right, we may soon be saying good‑bye to the idea that our universe was a single fireball created in the Big Bang."

Although this picture is appealing, it also raises more questions. Can life exist on these parallel universes? Stephen Hawking is doubtful; he believes that our universe may co‑exist with other universes, but our universe is special. The probability of forming these other bubbles is vanishingly small.

On the other hand, Weinberg believes most of these parallel universes are probably dead. To have stable DNA molecules, the proton must be stable for at least 3 billion years. In these dead universes, the protons might have decayed into a sea of electrons and neutrinos.

Our universe may be one of the few compatible with life. This would, in fact, answer the age‑old question of why the physical constants of the universe fall in a narrow band compatible with the formation of life. If the charge of the electron, the gravitational constant, etc. were changed slightly, then life would have been impossible. This is called the Anthropic Principle. As Freeman Dyson of Princeton said, "It's as if the universe knew we were coming." The strong version of this states that this proves the existence of God or an all‑powerful deity.

But according to quantum cosmology, perhaps there are millions of dead universes. It was an accident, therefore, that our universe had conditions compatible with the formation of stable DNA molecules." Dr. Michio Kaku[1]

Similarly Alan Guth in “An Eternity of Bubbles” explains:

"Nonetheless, an understanding of the infinite tree of universes seems to be needed in order to make statistical predictions about the properties of our own universe, which is assumed to be a typical "branch" on the tree.

In studying a scenario such as this, cosmologists generally assume that the laws of physics are the same throughout this multi‑bubble universe. We don't really have any way of knowing, but our goal is to understand the consequences of the laws of physics as we know them, and not to idly speculate about other mythical worlds. Nonetheless, there is a possibility that the other bubbles could be very different from our own. While empty space appears to be devoid of properties, to a modern particle physicist empty space, also called the vacuum, is an enormously complicated substance. Particle‑antiparticle pairs are incessantly appearing and disappearing, and space itself is believed to break up into a poorly understood "quantum foam" when magnified enough so that distances as short as 10‑33 centimeter become visible. Because of this complexity, physicists do not know whether only one kind of empty space is stable, or whether there are many kinds. Other kinds of space might not be three‑dimensional, and they might alter the masses of elementary particles, or the forces that govern their behavior. If there are many kinds of space, the infinite tree of bubble universes would sample all the possibilities."



Anthropic Principle

Note that if some of the finely‑balanced quantities were not finely‑tuned
then our Universe would have grossly different properties. The properties would in fact be so different that it is highly likely that life (as we know it) would not develop and be around to ask the question of why the Universe is special. That is, selection effects would say that it is only in universes where the conditions are right for life (thus pre‑selecting certain universe) is it possible for the questions of specialness to be posed.

This statement and variants of this statement are the gist of the Anthropic Principle. Note that the Anthropic Principle is probably true and says that there is nothing mysterious about why our Universe is special. However, it does not rule out the possibility that there is a deeper level to our understanding of the Universe which makes our Universe the most probable universe from the plethora of all possible universes. This still may be true but is not required philosophically or scientifically.




"Uns Christen fällt es sicherlich leichter, ausgehend von der Botschaft des Christfestes sowie des Evangeliums insgesamt, Antworten auf existenzielle Fragen der Menschen zu finden." Stoiber

This is probably not true. 12/17/00

May 13, 2001

It is clear that a universe that has life on it like us is wildly improbable. The only ways to explain our existence then are (i) intelligent creation or (ii) a huge number of tosses of the dice that makes improbable events possible. There does not seem to be any basis, a priori or posteriori, on which to pick among between the options. One may either indulge in a preference for God or a preference for an impersonal algorithm that must lead to all things given enough opportunities.

The Darwinian, having gotten so far without a God to design anything, is loath to allow a designer for the universe. We may sympathize with his desire for a unified set of explanation, but his plot does not work when contemplating potentially unique events. Without time and many, many chances, there is no way to explain the world save by resorting to design. By assuming many tosses of the dice, our Darwinian hero makes the same sort of aesthetic choice as the man of religious faith.

The prospect that horrified old Nietzsche, the Eternal Return, requires more than just a huge number of universes. The number must be infinite and the number of different types of universes finite.

There is a temptation to assume an infinite number once one has assume a huge number. But it does not seem to be a legitimate step, just a natural one.

We are free, indeed, to assume it is all is unique if we wish to. (5/24/01 printed)


[1]Prof. of theoretical physics at the City Univ. of New York and author of Hyperspace: a Scientific Odyssey through the 10th Dimension (Oxford Univ. Press).
 
 
 
 

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